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Money laundering is the act of converting money gained
from illegal activity, such as drug smuggling, into money
that appears legitimate and in which the source cannot be
traced to the illegal activi ty. Criminal proceeds also
include that which is derived from tax evasion. Estimates
of the scale of money laundering globally range between 2
and 5% of the worlds Gross Domestic Product. Another
study refers to money laundering as the third largest
industry globally.
Money laundering has devastating consequences for
countries individually and for the global economy as a
whole. Potential macroeconomic consequences include
inexplicable changes in money demand, greater prudential
risks to banks' soundness, contamination effects on legal
financial transactions and greater volatility of
international capital flows and exchange rates due to
unanticipated cross-border asset transfers.
A number of initiatives have been established for dealing
with the problem at international level. Amongst the most
significant is the formation of the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF), a body that was established by the G-7
nations in 1989 to develop a coordinated international
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response to money laundering. South Africa was recently
accepted as a full member of the FAFT, having satisfied
the FATF recommendations with the implementation of a
Financial Intelligence Centre Act.
The provisions of the Act came into effect on 1 June
2003. The Act imposes reporting obligations on
accountable institutions like banks, insurance companies,
estate agent and casinos. The Financial Intelligence
Centre (FIC) is established by the Act in order to
identify the proceeds of unlawful activities and to
combat money-laundering activi ties. It aims to do so by
making information collected by it available to
investigating authorities (South African Police,
Scorpions, Asset Forfeiture Unit etc. including SARS).
The FIC will in the course of its functions build up a
database of information, which it will retain and utilise
to support the above-mentioned bodies in the performance
of their functions.
The FICA creates a special relationship particularly with
SARS. The FIC data will assist SARS to combat tax evasion
and to collect taxes more effectively. The Act explicitly
requires all institutions to report any transactions that
may be relevant to the investigation of any evasion or
attempted evasion of any tax, levy or duty.
Money laundering by its very nature does not lend itself
to being accurately measured but based on estimates
discussed above, this can amount to a substantial loss to
the fiscus. The estimated range of between 2 and 5% of
the world's GDP would translate to between R24 and R60
billion being laundered annually in South Africa. If one
applies the minimum marginal tax rate of 18%, one arrives
at a potential loss of between R4.32 and RI0.8 billion to
the fiscus.
Whilst the new Financial Intelligence Centre Act cannot
totally eradicate the laundering of undeclared or
criminal proceeds, the many obligations now placed on
accountable institutions in terms of the Act is most
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Over the past two decades, the international campaign
against money laundering has gained momentum due to
concerns about organised crime, tax evasion and, more
recently, terrorism. Closer to home, South Africa has
recently joined other developed countries by introducing
legislation that further narrows the scope to launder
money in our country. Many people may think money-
laundering legislation is no concern of theirs, but if
one has dealings with attorneys, estate agents,
stockbrokers, unit trust management companies, banks,
insurance companies, financial advisers or asset
managers, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act affects
you.
Money laundering can be broadly defined as any activi ty
that has, or is likely to have, the effect of concealing
the movement of the proceeds of unlawful activities. That
encompasses a wide range of possibilities, and the
Financial Intelligence Centre Act of 2001 (FICA), which
came into effect on 30 June 2003, casts a very wide net
to catch them all. This it does by placing special
obligations on all institutions that carry out financial
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transactions on behalf of clients. Since June 30, these
"accountable institutions" (Annexure 1) , as the
legislation calls them, have to keep much more detailed
records relating to their clients and the sources of
their funds. And not only do they have to gather the
information, but they have an obligation to verify it,
too. This means that every time one enters into a new
business relationship or transacts for the first time
with a company that is classified as an accountable
insti tution, one needs to provide more information than
was required in the past - with the documentary evidence
to support it.
Apart from gathering and verifying information routinely,
accountable institutions are obliged to report to the
Financial Intelligence Centre any transactions that may
be deemed "suspicious transactions", in that they are
being used, or are suspected of being used, for money-
laundering purposes. A transaction is regarded as
suspicious if, for example, it is known or suspected to
have no legitimate business purpose or is relevant to an
investigation of tax evasion or attempted tax evasion.
The study first examines the concept of money laundering
with an emphasis on its economic and fiscal implications,
generally first, and then more specifically in a South
African context. This initial discussion creates a
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foundation for exploring the impact of the Financial
Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) on the fiscus, which is an
important consideration in this study.
The chapter that follows defines the term money
laundering and offers insights into the actual methods of
money laundering including a typical profile of a money
launderer. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the problem from a
global perspective. The magnitude and scale of the
problem is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on
international efforts to combat money laundering
including developments in the United States and United
Kingdom. The devastating implications of money laundering
for a country's economy, society, political system and
overall development are considered in Chapter 5. The
South African context in chapter 6 explains our
legislative record with regard to money laundering and
contains a discussion on money laundering trends unique
to us in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre
Act, which is relatively new to us, is analysed in
chapter 7. Before concluding the study, an attempt is
made in chapter 8 to place in perspective the potential





Money laundering has been given many definitions. One
definition is that money laundering is the act of
converting money gained from illegal activi ty, such as
drug smuggling, into money that appears legitimate and in
which the source cannot be traced to the illegal activity
(Stressens: 2000) . Another author (Madinger: 1999)
defines it as follows: "The phrase 'money laundering'
covers all procedures to change the identity of illegally
obtained money so that it appears to have originated from
a legitimate source. The official definition by the
Uni ted Nations is "Money laundering is the process by
which criminals attempt to conceal the true origin and
ownership of the processes of their criminal activities.
If undertaken successfully, it also allows them to
maintain control over those proceeds and, ultimately, to
provide a legitimate cover for their source of income
(Najajima: 1999).
A summarised definition of money laundering would
therefore be that money laundering is a process by which
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the proceeds of crime are hidden from investigators,
moved around financial and economic systems in order to
make tracing them more difficult and then spent as if
they are legitimate funds. It should be noted at this
stage that money laundering refers to the proceeds of any
crime that results in the proceeds being laundered or
cleansed, although early money laundering control efforts
focused on drug proceeds.
Money laundering is, in essence, the process of
concealing the nature, source or location of criminal
proceeds including tax evasion. This process is of
critical importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy
these profits without jeopardizing their source. When a
criminal activity generates substantial profits, the
individual or group involved must find a way to control
the funds without attracting attention to the underlying
activity or the persons involved (Rider: 1996)
2.2 How is money laundered?
In the initial or placement stage of money laundering,
the launderer introduces his illegal profits into the
financial system. This might be done by breaking up large
amounts of cash into less conspicuous smaller sums that
are then deposited directly into a bank account, or by
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purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques,
money orders, etc.) that are then collected and deposited
into accounts at another location (Zeldin: 1998).
After the funds have entered the financial system, the
second - or layering - stage takes place. In this phase,
the launderer engages in a series of conversions or
movements of the funds to distance them from their
source. The funds might be channelled through the
purchase and sales of investment instruments, or the
launderer might simply wire the funds through a series of
accounts at various banks across the world (Zeldin:
1998) . This use of widely scattered accounts for
laundering is especially prevalent in those jurisdictions
that do not co-operate in anti-money laundering
investigations (Froomkin: 1997). In some instances, the
launderer might disguise the transfers as payments for
goods or services, thus giving them a legitimate
appearance.
Having successfully processed his criminal profits
through the first two phases of the money laundering
process, the launderer then moves them to the third stage
integration in which the funds re-enter the
legitimate economy (Zeldin: 1998) The launderer might
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choose to invest the funds into property, luxury assets,
or business ventures.
The process is illustrated diagrammatically below.
Organised criminal group




























Source: P Smit: Clean Money Suspect Source 2001.
2.3 Profile of the Money Launderer
The term money launderer obviously has negative
connotations and the practice of money laundering
conj ures up a shady world of men in pinstriped suits
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claiming to be "bankers" and acting for ill-defined
customers and vague offshore businesses (Carr: 1989). The
fact that many of the cases that have become known
involve exactly such scenarios has tended to reinforce
such perceptions. These professional financial managers,
trust officers, attorneys and bankers (those who fit the
profile of the modern money launderer), who assist
criminals and terrorists to retain their ill-gotten gains
and further their illicit enterprises, cannot be
distanced from the crooks they serve. When the money is
the product of drug trafficking or even a bank robbery,
then the stigma that can attach to those who assist in
the laundering process is very much the same. These
professionals that are actively involved in providing
such services may never transgress the law in many cases,
the laundering may well involve funds that are not





3.1 Scale of the problem
Many attempts have been made to quantify the size of the
money laundering industry and the effects on the world's
economy of this industry. The scale of the activi ty is
also difficult to estimate because it is secretive and
misleading by nature. It is therefor only possible to
provide figures on the incidence of money laundering
based on estimates and speculation (Black: 1988). There
are, however, a few indicators from which coclusions on
the incidence of money laundering can be drawn. These
include the number of suspicious transactions identified
by financial institutions, the number of organised
criminal groups identified by law enforcement
authorities, the number of prosecutions for money
laundering activities and forfeitures of proceeds of
criminal activities, and global economic trends
concerning trade and flow of funds (Smit: 1997).
As well as making extensive use of cash, serious and
organised criminals will often go to great lengths to
avoid arousing suspicion when dealing with the regulated
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financial sector as suspicious financial transactions,
including cash payments, are subject to a disclosure
regime. However, use of the regulated sector is
unavoidable if serious and organised criminals wish to
legitimise their criminal proceeds. The International
Monetary Fund estimates that the aggregate size of money
laundering in the world could be somewhere between two
and five percent of the world's gross domestic product
(Hinterseer: 1997) . Using 1996 statistics, these
percentages would indicate that money laundering ranged
between us Dollar (USD) 590 billion and USD 1.5 trillion.
The lower figure is roughly equivalent to the value of
the total output of an economy the size of Spain
(Hinterseer: 1997). Another study estimated that global
money laundering involves as much as USD 300 billion
annually (Black: 1990).
The influence wielded by criminal groups controlling such
incredible wealth has led world leaders to deem money
laundering a geopolitical problem, which, if unchecked,
threatens the political fabric of fragile democracies and
democratic institutions everywhere (Paradise: 1998). In
another article (Biros: 1995 ) money laundering was
referred to as the third largest industry globally: Money
laundering is said to be the third largest industry by
value worldwide. Research in the United States has shown
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that 90% of currency bills in circulation are
contaminated with narcotics. In the United Kingdom,
similar research showed 40% to be contaminated (Bentham:
1998). Other research in the United Kingdom has shown
that 80% of property related crime is committed to fund a
drug habit. A single user shooting one shot of heroin a
day needs to spend £28,500 each year just to feed his
personal consumption. In order to fund that amount, he
will turn to robbery, dealing in drugs, prostitution and
theft. In the United Kingdom, stolen household and office
goods realize approximately one-third of their new value
(Reuter: 1996).
HM Customs and Excise (UK) recently estimated the annual
proceeds from crime in the UK at anywhere between £19
billion and £48 billion, with £25 billion possibly being
a realistic figure for the amount actually laundered.
Based on the January 2000 International Monetary Fund
estimate of undeclared economic activity in the UK
representing around 13 percent of Gross Domestic Product,
£25 billion would equate to roughly one fifth of all
undeclared economic activity (Elliot: 1997)
Another study (Walker: 1995) has looked at the scarce
data available to measure money laundering, and assembled
a number of estimates of the extent of money laundering
in and through Australia. Between $1000 and $4500 million
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of hot money is believed to be generated in Australia and
laundered, either in Australia or sent overseas. Perhaps
the most likely figure is around $3500 million. Under any
assumption, the greatest components of this quantum are
sourced by fraudulent offences followed by the drugs
trade - virtually nothing else matters (Walker: 1995).
3 . 2 Tax Havens
In October 1986, the United States became the first
country in the world to criminalize money laundering. In
the next decade, each of the world's leading financial
centers followed suit, enacting anti-laundering laws and
enlisting the aid of financial institutions in detecting
and preventing money laundering activities. Forced by
these efforts to find new avenues for laundering illicit
proceeds, money launderers turned to the privacy,
confidentiality, minimal regulation and security of small
islands and territories or tax havens, as they are also
known (Hampton: 1996)
For many tax havens like Isle of Man, Jersey and
Guernsey international banking is an important segment of
their economic well-being. It provides jobs,
international exposure and much needed revenue for their
treasuries (United Nations: 1998) . It is a clean,
desirable industry. In order to attract money offshore,
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banks in the small countries must offer a more favorable
banking environment. This translates to minimum taxes and
maximum confidentiality, which in turn lead to a higher
risk of infiltration by criminally derived money seeking
to be laundered. The service offered always includes
confidentiality. This is especially true for the wealthy
from other Third World countries seeking a safe haven for
their capital. As a consequence, international bankers in
tax havens commonly assist their clientele in achieving
their confidentiality goals through such legal vehicles
as corporations and trusts (Maynard: 1998) These
vehicles are used for legitimate reasons, notably tax and
estate planning. Indeed, avoidance of tax liability and
estate complications in a foreign country is certainly
understandable and lawful goals, which are preferably
obtained from tax preferential jurisdictions.
This type of environment offers opportunities for certain
forms of money laundering. By its very nature,
international banking lends itself to large, non-cash
deposits and to more sophisticated forms of financial
transactions using electronic methods to transfer large
sums of money to both offshore and onshore destinations
(Bosworth-Davies: 1992).
14
Studies have shown that these tax havens contribute
Ii ttle to the surrounding economy and do not form the
basis for sustained economic growth (Masciandaro: 1998).
The tax havens are virtually costless to establish, and
therefore competition among them for customers is severe.
Second, because tax havens provide little value-added
services, such financial centers generate almost no
economic demand for the surrounding "real" economy in
terms of employment, goods, or services (Musalem: 1999).
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Chapter 4
International efforts to combat Money
laundering
For many years the fight against money laundering has
been an essential part of the overall struggle to combat
illegal narcotics trafficking and the activities of
organized crime. During that time, the key issue involved
in the anti-money laundering effort has been ensuring
that the critical piece or pieces of information make it
to the right people - the investigators and prosecutors
charged with putting criminals behind bars and taking
their illegally obtained wealth away - in a timely and
useful manner (Alexander: 1998). The information needed
to support anti-money laundering investigations often
involves a wide range of human activity beyond that based
purely on criminal motivation. Countering money
laundering effectively requires not only knowledge of
laws and regulations, investigation, and analysis, but
also of banking, finance, accounting and other related
economic activi ties. Money laundering is after all an
economic phenomenon; launderers rely to a certain extent
on already existing financial and business practices (and
the lack of understanding of these by the law enforcement
communi ty) as a way of hiding illegally obtained funds.
Anti-money laundering investigations conceivably touch a
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number of law enforcement agencies wi thin a particular
jurisdiction. This along with the fact of ever-present
resource limitations means that a completely effective,
multi-disciplined approach for combating money laundering
is often beyond the reach of any single law enforcement
or prosecutorial authority (Savona: 1997)
In many cases, there is also reluctance on the part of
financial institutions to provide to government
authorities information that might be related to but is
not obviously indicative of a crime. One may add to these
restrictions on information exchange in certain
instances, the unwillingness or inability to share such
information among relevant government agencies and the
seemingly insurmountable obstacles to rapid exchanges of
information with foreign counterparts. All of these
barriers to information exchange directly affect the
outcome of anti-money laundering investigations. Since
money is constantly changing hands the crime of money
laundering may not become completely obvious until many
or all of the pieces are put together (Pheiffer: 1998)
The task of Financial Intelligence Units worldwide was
after 11 September 2001, to include combating financing
of terrorism and to count on a virtually immediate
exchange of information. This information exchange has to
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be at an early point after possible detection of a crime
the so-called "pre-investigative" or intelligence
stage. Large-scale money laundering schemes invariably
contain cross border elements. Since money laundering is
an international problem, international co-operation is a
critical necessity in the fight against it (Herbert:
2002) •
A number of initiatives have been established for dealing
with the problem at the international level.
International organizations, such as the United Nations
or the Bank for International Settlements, took some
ini tial steps at the end of the 1980s to address the
problem (Price Waterhouse Coopers: 2002) • The most
significant developments in this regard, however, was the
formation of the Financial Action Task Force and the
Egmont group. A discussion follows on these two important
organizations.
4.1 Financial Action Task Force on money
laundering (FATF)
A major initiative in 1989 to counter money laundering
was the establishment of the Financial Action Task Force
on money laundering (FATF) by the G-7 Summit in Paris to
develop a co-ordinated international response (Gilmore:
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1999). One of the first tasks of the FATF was to develop
recommendations, forty in total. The forty
recommendations, which were revised in 1996, are a









financial system and its regu-lation; and international
co-operation. Each FATF member has made a firm political
commitment to combat money laundering based on them. The
40 Recommendations have come to be recognised as the
international standard for anti-money laundering
programmes (Parlour: 1995).
A number of non-FATF Member countries have used them in
developing their efforts to address the issue. Members of
the FATF include 29 countries and jurisdictions including
the major financial centre countries of Europe, North and
South America, and Asia as well as the European
Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council. The FATF
works closely with other international bodies involved in
combating money laundering. While its secretariat is
housed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD),
However, where the
the FATF is not part of the OECD.
efforts of the OECD and FATF
complement each other, such as on bribery and corruption
or the functioning of the international financial system,
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the two secretariats consult with each other and exchange
information (Uni ted Nations: 1996) The OECD is a
representative body of the world's industrial powers.
4 . 2 The Egmon t Group
Despite the fact that countries created their own
Financial Intelligence Units (FlU's) in several
jurisdictions throughout the world during the first years
of the 1990s, their creation was still at first seen as
isolated and related to the specific needs of those
jurisdictions establishing them (Levi: 1997). Since 1995,
a number of FlU's began working together in an informal
organization known as the Egmont Group (named for the
location of the first meeting at the Egmont-Arenberg
Palace in Brussels). The groups membership has now grown
to 94 Financial Intelligence Units (FlU) from different
countries. The goal of the Group is to provide a forum
for FlU's to improve support to their respective national
anti-money laundering programmes. This support includes
expanding and systematizing the exchange of financial
intelligence information, improving expertise and
capabilities of personnel of such organizations and
fostering better communication among FlU's through
application of technology (Graycar: 1996).
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In a June 1997 meeting held in Madrid, Spain and at which
35 countries and 5 international organizations were
present, the Egmont Group made significant steps forward
in several areas. Perhaps the most important of these was
the adoption by the Group of its Statement of Purpose, a
document that describes the work accomplished so far, as
well as its current goals within the framework of
national and international anti-money laundering efforts.
The FlU definition adopted in Rome was applied to all
participating agencies - 28 of them were found to meet it
- and this definition was incorporated into the Statement
of Purpose (Sheptycki: 1995).
4.3 The Initiatives of UK and USA
The United Kingdom and the United States of America were
amongst the first countries to implement internal systems
to combat money laundering. These initiatives are
discussed below.
4.3.1 United Kingdom
In Britain, the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986
made the laundering of the proceeds of drug related
crimes. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act of 1989 also made it an offense to
launder the funds of terrorist organizations (Levi:
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The Egmont Group examined the functions of the various
FlU's and like agencies so as to determine those missions
and functions that are carried out in common. The Egmont
Group came to an agreement on the definition of an FlU, a
defini tion that will likely facilitate the establishment
of new units by setting a minimum standard for such a










requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent
authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i)
concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) required
by national legislation or regulation,
counter money laundering" (Thony: 1996).
in order to
The definition also helped create a specific identity for
the Egmont Group as distinct from FATF or other
international bodies concerned with money laundering. The
definition was meant to be specific enough to distinguish
these agencies from other types of government
authorities, yet it had to be generic enough to include
the many variations of these units. Since the Egmont
Group adopted this definition, it has increasingly become
the standard against which newly forming units are
measured.
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1995). The United Kingdom authorities have recognized
that London's financial markets are of great importance,
not only in relation to the U. K. economy, but also in
relation to global financial markets. They have also seen
the need to protect the financial and operational
integrity of those markets. The provisions relating to
the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking have
been consolidated and re-enacted in the Drug Trafficking
Act 1994. The 1994 Act provides that it is an offense for
anyone to assist drug traffickers to launder money by
assisting them to retain or control the benefits of their
criminal activity, even if this merely amounts to
providing advice (Mitchell: 1996).
The U.K. is also an attractive target for money
launderers. The attraction for the money launderer lies
in the fact that London's financial markets have the
necessary breadth, depth and openness to be useful at all
stages of the money laundering process, whether it is
placement, layering or integration. This attraction has
been increased by the introduction of the European
Union's single market in banking, investment services and
insurance and the lowering of controls and barriers to
free movement of goods, services, people and capital
around Europe (Magliveras: 2002)
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4.3.2 United States
The first time in the world that any nation enacted a
specific law against money laundering was in the fall of
1986 when President Ronald Reagan signed the Money
Laundering Control Act. This Act has subsequently been
expanded in each election year (including elections for
Congress 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994), which suggests at
the very least some political consideration for the
implementation and strengthening of money laundering laws
(Mckenzi: 1991). The law was broader than the common
usage of the phrase money laundering. It is not limited
to cash, but includes all monetary instruments and all
financial transactions. Indeed, in the United States,
dirty money never loses its taint and is never cleansed.
In essence, the law criminalizes banking services to




Economic Effects of Money Laundering
5.1 Macroeconomic impact of money laundering
The estimates of the present scale of money laundering
transactions are almost beyond imagination-2 to 5 percent
of global GDP would probably be a consensus range. This
scale poses two sorts of risks: one prudential, the other
macroeconomic (Quirk: 1996). Markets and even smaller
economies can be corrupted and destabilized. Evidence of
this has been seen in countries and regions, which have
harbored large-scale criminal organizations (Quirk: 1996)
In the beginning, good and bad monies intermingle, and
the country or region appears to prosper, but in the end
there is a tremendous risk that only the corrupt
financiers remain. Lasting damage can clearly be done,
when the infrastructure that has been built up to
guarantee the integrity of the markets is lost. Even in
countries that have not reached this point, the available
evidence suggests that the impact of money laundering is
large enough that macroeconomic policy makers must take
it into account. Money subject to laundering behaves in
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accordance with particular management principles
(Bartlett: 2000)
There is evidence (Ali: 1998) that it is less productive,
and therefore that it contributes minimally, to say the
least, to optimization of economic growth. Potential
macroeconomic consequences of money laundering include,
but are not limited to:
• inexplicable changes in money demand,
• greater prudential risks to bank soundness,
• contamination
transactions,
effects on legal financial
• and greater volatility of international capital
flows and exchange rates due to unanticipated cross-
border asset transfers.
One cannot only emphasize the economic costs, but also
the social and political dimensions of crime and related
money laundering-the suffering of the victims and the
overall weakening of the social fabric and collective
ethical standards. There have been a few detailed studies
to measure the extent and economic impact of money
laundering. Consequently, the major findings of the
studies are reproduced in this chapter.
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The negative economic effects of money laundering on
economic development are difficult to quantify, yet it is
clear that such activity damages the financial-sector
institutions that are critical to economic growth,
reduces productivity· in the economy's real sector by












capi tal flows, to the detriment of long-term economic
development (Jordan: 1999).
Effective anti-money-laundering policies, on the other
hand, reinforce a variety of other good-governance
policies that help sustain economic development,
particularly through the strengthening of the financial
sector.
A study by (Quirk: 1996) analyzed three specific areas of
the economy that are impacted namely; the financial
sector, the real sector and the external sector. These
findings are briefly summarized below.
The financial sector
A broad range of recent economic analyses points to the
conclusion that strong developing-country financial
institutions such as banks, insurance companies and
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equity markets are critical to economic growth. Such
institutions allow for
• the concentration of capital resources from domestic
savings and perhaps even funds from abroad and
• the efficient allocation of such resources to
investment projects that generate sustained economic
development.
Money laundering impairs the development of these
important financial institutions for two reasons.
First, money laundering erodes financial institutions
themselves. Within these institutions, there is often a
correlation between money laundering and fraudulent
activities undertaken by employees. At higher volumes of
money-laundering activi ty, entire financial institutions
in developing countries are vulnerable to corruption by
criminal elements seeking to gain further influence over
their money-laundering channels.
Second, particularly in developing countries, customer
trust is fundamental to the growth of sound financial
insti tutions, and the perceived risk to depositors and
investors from institutional fraud and corruption is an
obstacle to such trust (Quirk: 1999).
By contrast, beyond protecting such institutions from the
negative effects of money laundering itself, the adoption
of anti-money-laundering policies by government and
regulators, as well as by banks, reinforce the other
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good-governance practices that are important to the
development of these economically critical institutions
(Quirk: 1999).
The real sector
Aside from money laundering's negative effect on
economic growth through its erosion of developing
countries' financial sectors, money laundering has a more
direct negative effect on economic growth in the real
sector by diverting resources to less-productive
activity, and by facilitating domestic corruption and
crime, which in turn depress economic growth (Quirk:
1999)
As can be seen from our earlier discussion in chapter 2,
money laundered through channels other than financial
institutions is often placed in what are known as
"sterile" investments, or investments that generate
Li. ttle additional productivi ty for the broader economy,
such as real estate, art, antiques, jewelry, and luxury
automobiles. For developing countries, the diversion of
such scarce resources to less-productive domestic assets
or luxury imports is a serious detriment to economic
growth. Moreover, criminal organizations can transform
productive enterprises into sterile investments by
operating them for the purposes of laundering illicit
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proceeds rather than as profit-maximizing enterprises
responsive to consumer demand and worthy of legitimate
investment capital.
Money laundering also facilitates crime and corruption
within developing economies, which negates sustainable
economic growth. Just as an efficient financial sector is
a key "input" to other productive processes in a
developing economy-such as manufacturing-an efficient
money-laundering channel is a key "input" to crime
because the financial proceeds from crime are less
valuable to the criminal (in a sense, an "unfinished
product") than are laundered funds. The less expensive
the money laundering "input" to crime is as a result of
lax anti-money-laundering policies, the more "productive"
(active) the criminal element will be, just as in any
industry or business. As numerous studies have
demonstrated from statistical and anecdotal evidence,
substantial crime and corruption act as a brake on
economic development, while other studies have shown that
anti-money-laundering policies can deter such activity
(Quirk: 1999).
The external sector
Unabated money laundering can also impair a developing
country's economy through the country's trade and
international capital flows. The well recognized problem
30
from developing countries isof illicit
typically
capital flight
facili tated by either domestic financial
institutions or by foreign financial institutions ranging
from offshore financial centers to major money-center
institutions such as those in New York, London, or Tokyo.
Given that illicit capital flight drains scarce resources
from developing economies, transnational money-laundering
activi ty helps impair developing-country growth. By
contrast, there is little evidence that the imposition of
anti-money-laundering policies in a given jurisdiction
spurs a significant flight of capital to more lax
jurisdictions.
Moreover, just as the confidence that developing-country
citizens have in their own domestic financial
institutions is critical to economic growth, the
confidence that foreign investors and foreign financial
institutions have in a developing country's financial
insti tutions is also important for developing economies
because of the role such confidence plays in investment
decisions and capital flows.
Money laundering can also be associated with significant
distortions to a country's imports and exports. On the
import side, criminal elements often use illicit proceeds
to purchase imported luxury goods, either with laundered
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funds or as part of the process of laundering such funds.
Such imports do not generate domestic economic activi ty
or employment, and in some cases can artificially depress
domestic prices, thus reducing the profitability of
domestic enterprises.
Moreover, International Monetary Fund studies suggest
that smaller countries can become favored by large-scale
money launderers for short periods of time, causing a






are unable to take
offsetting monetary or exchange-rate measures.
5.2 Implications for a countries political system
Money laundering trends have also increased the
vulnerabili ty of politicians or government officials to
the dangers of money laundering. The criminal proceeds
laundered through businesses are far more corrosive of
local political structures than they are when transiting
the international banking community in the form of cash
in suitcases (Naylor: 1987).
Inevi tably money laundering on any scale will undermine
the financial structure and the judicial process, buy
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political protection and will neutralize any local or
international law enforcement effort. Small islands and
terri tories in particular slip easily under the control
of criminal elements, usually fronted by rich and
apparently successful local businessmen who exercise a
degree of political influence through their contribution
to the political parties. Increasingly in a country,
political influence is determined by the funds available
as old political dogma tends to become irrelevant as the
costs of political campaigns rise (Rose-Ackerman: 1999)
5.3 Implications for economic development
Launderers are continuously looking for new routes for
laundering their funds. Economies with growing or
developing financial centers, but inadequate controls are
particularly vulnerable as established financial center
countries implement comprehensive anti-money laundering
regimes. Launderers, who tend to move their networks to
countries and financial systems with weak or ineffective
countermeasures, will exploit differences between
national anti-money laundering systems. Some might argue
that developing economies cannot afford to be too
selective about the sources of capital they attract. But
postponing action is obviously dangerous. The more it is
deferred, the more entrenched organized crime can become.
33
As with the damaged integrity of an individual financial
institution, there is a damping effect on foreign direct
investment when a country's commercial and financial
sectors are perceived to be subj ect to the control and
influence of organized crime (Bartlett: 2000).
5.4 Implications for society at large
The possible social and political costs of money
laundering, if left unchecked or dealt with
ineffectively, are serious. Organized crime can
infiltrate financial institutions, acquire control of
large sectors of the economy through investment, or offer
bribes to public officials and indeed governments. The
economic and political influence of criminal
organizations can weaken the social fabric, collective
ethical standards, and ultimately the democratic










fundamentally, money laundering is inextricably linked to
the underlying criminal activity that generated it.
Laundering enables criminal activity to continue.
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Chapter 6
Money Laundering in South African context
6.1 South Africa's Money laundering legislation
Since 1992, the South African Reserve Bank has been in
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the United States Federal Reserve Bank and many European
financial institutions to ensure that South Africa can
compete on the international stage with sophisticated and
stable money markets (Itzikowitz: 1998).
To comply with international banking standards, South
Africa has promulgated various anti money laundering
laws, including:
• Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act (1992)
• Proceeds of Crime Act (1996).
• Prevention of Organized Crime Act (1998).
• Financial Intelligence Centre Act (2001).
All these laws have been designed to make South Africa
compliant with anti-money laundering legislation and to
assist with the tracking and tracing of money worldwide.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of these laws has yet to
be tested. Meanwhile, the threats of money laundering and
35
terrorist financing remain unchallenged and more
stringent methods are required.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act and the
establishment of the Centre are based on Government's
understanding of the longstanding, global effort to
combat organized crime and money laundering. In doing so,
Government's priority has been to ensure the sound health
of the country's financial system by preventing it from
being contaminated and undermined by funds and hot money
flowing as proceeds from crime. It has simultaneously
created a tool for law enforcement to minimize money
laundering and reduce organized criminal activities.
Money laundering is a problem for which the solution is
international co-operation.








countries recognised that individual countries working in
isolation would not find the solution to the money-
laundering problem. Instead, international cooperation
was a prerequisite for success.
South Africa enacted the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act
in 1992, which first introduced a money laundering
offence on the statute book and which was followed by the
Proceeds of Crime Act (PCA) of 1996. The PCA introduced a
broader range of offences and criminalized money
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laundering for the first time. In 1999, the Proceeds of
Crime Act, as well as the laundering provisions of the
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, were repealed when the
Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA) came into effect
(De Koker: 1999).
This act had the effect of:
1. criminalizing racketeering and creating offences
relating to activities of criminal gangs;
2. criminalizing money laundering in general and also
creating a number of serious offences in respect of
laundering and racketeering;
3. contains a general reporting obligation for
businesses coming into possession of suspicious
property; and
4. contains mechanisms for criminal confiscation of the
proceeds of crime and for civil forfeiture of the
proceeds and instrumentalities of offences.
POCA creates two sets of money laundering offences
1. offences involving proceeds of all forms of crime;
and
2. offences involving proceeds of a pattern of
racketeering.
37
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act or 2001 was
introduced to compliment the Prevention of Organized
Crime Act. The provisions of FICA came into effect in
February 2002. The next chapter discusses this new
legislation, which is a main focus of this study.
6.2 International acceptance of SA's progress
South Africa satisfied the maj or Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) Recommendations with the introduction of
FICA. The FATF has developed a set of Recommendations,
which set out the principles of the body and act as a
'global standard for the combating of money laundering and
the financing of terrorism (Van Zyl: 1997). However in
terms of these 40 Recommendations, South Africa is
required to become a member of the Eastern and Southern
African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) . The
ESAAMLG was established in November 1999 as the regional
body of the FATF. The present members are Republics of
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and
recently by the Kingdom of Swaziland. Finance Minister
Trevor Manual highlighted the importance of South
Africa's acceptance internationally
"Cabinet approval has been granted for South Africa to
take its rightful place as a member of ESAAMLG, and our
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membership is important for South Africa for a number of
related reasons:
• Government has demonstrated that it is committed to
combat organized crime and money laundering by
passing the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, 1998
and the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001.
However, for South Africa to become fully compliant
with the FATF requirements and to thereby gain
international acceptance for its anti-money
laundering stance it needs to become a member of the
ESAAMLG. Membership of regional bodies, such as
ESAAMLG, is a requirement for membership of FATF,
should South Africa wish to take up such membership.
• Already South African business in the financial
sector is increasingly faced with questions from
international counterparts regarding the South
Africa's anti-money laundering stance and its
membership of regional anti-money laundering bodies.
It is anticipated that this pressure will grow in
the period going forward.
• Membership will also obviate pressure to place South
Africa on the FATF list of Non-Cooperating Countries
and Territories (NCCT) , thereby effectively
blacklisting the country.
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• The problem of money laundering cannot be dealt with
in isolation by one country because of the ease with
which money is able to flow across borders and
requires coordination and mutual support between
neighboring countries. This will further strengthen
South Africa's anti-money laundering mechanisms.
• Membership of the ESAAMLG will give the FIC easier
access to other financial intelligence units on a
continuous basis, thereby enabling it to share
information and expertise"
The South African Financial Intelligence Centre was
accepted as a member by the Egmont Group, a global forum
for financial intelligence units, at its annual meeting
held in Sydney, Australia in June 2003. By succeeding in
its application to join the Egmont Group, the FIC thereby
joined an international community with a growing
membership of 94 Financial Intelligence Units (FlU) from
different countries." South African Minister of Finance
Trevor Manual
6.3 Money laundering trends specific to South
Africa
In March 2002 Rand Afrikaans University's (RAU's) Centre
for the Study of Economic Crime released a report on
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of a group of expert investigators of
laundering
perceptions
trends. This report was based on the
economic crime who attended a workshop on money
laundering trends at RAU in December 2001. The following
is a summary of the broad themes identified in the
report: (Centre for the Study of Economic Crime (RAU):
2001)
• purchase of goods and properties;
• abuse of businesses and business entities;
• use of cash and currency;
• abuse of financial institutions;
• abuse of the informal sector of the economy; and
• use of professional assistance.
Purchase of goods and properties
South African criminals often display their illegally
acquired wealth. Money is spent on expensive clothes,
personal effects, vehicles, property and furniture. In
coastal areas boats, some criminals also purchase jet
skis and yachts and in rural areas livestock and farm
implements are bought. According to the report these
purchases are not necessarily made with the intention to
launder money. In the majority of cases criminals merely
want to enj oy the proceeds of their crimes and improve
their lifestyles. However, in view of the broad
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definition of laundering in South African law, such
transactions would still constitute laundering offences
under POCA. Vehicles and real estate are often registered
in the names of the criminals, but sophisticated
criminals who are concerned about the risks of
confiscation and forfeiture of their assets ensure that
these assets are registered in the name of a front
company, a family member or a close friend. These
criminals would often register real estate in the name of
a family trust or business trust, which is ultimately
controlled by the criminal. Real estate transactions are
also abused in another way to launder money: Proceeds of
crime are paid into the trust account of an attorney or
an estate agent by a new client who instructs the
attorney or agent to assist him in acquiring a property.
A few days later the client cancels the instructions and
requests the repayment of the money. The money is often
repaid by means of a cheque drawn by the attorney or the
estate agent. In these cases the criminal uses the scam
of a transaction to launder a sizable amount of money
through the trust account of the attorney or estate
agent. Al though vehicles are often bought for cash and
real estate transactions are sometimes settled in cash,
cases have also been encountered where the criminal
obtained financing for the transaction from a financial
institution. The proceeds of crime are then used to
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settle the hire purchase obligations or to payoff the
bond in a short period. In certain cases, the payments
continue after all the obligations to the financial
institution were met. As a result a surplus amount builds
up in the particular account. Such amounts can escape
detection by law enforcement authorities.
Abuse of businesses and business entities
Criminals often use business activities and business
enterprises to launder money. Such business activi ties
are conducted in the formal and informal sectors of the
South African economy. These business enterprises can be
unincorporated (for instance sole proprietorships,
business trusts and partnerships) or incorporated (for
instance close corporations and companies) . Shell
corporations are sometimes used to open and operate bank
accounts. These entities will not actually be trading and
their main purposes would be to provide the criminal with
a corporate cloak under which he could hide his identity
and launder money. The shareholders, directors or members
of these shell corporations are often family members or











personally or through an agent, such as an auditor or
attorney, or be bought as pre-registered (so-called shelf
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companies). Shelf companies are advertised for as little
as R650 and close corporations for only R450.
Front businesses often feature in laundering schemes.
Unlike shell corporations, these businesses are trading
actively. The proceeds of crime are used to fund the
business activi ties of the enterprise and/or are simply
co-mingled with the legitimate proceeds of the business
itself and deposited into the bank account of the
business as the proceeds of the business. If the criminal
launders cash, the front business will normally be cash-
based to facilitate the process. Examples of such
businesses that have been encountered in South Africa
include bars, restaurants, shebeens, cash loans
businesses and cell phone shops.
Use of cash and currency
Criminals who commit offences that generate cash
proceeds, for instance cash heists or drug trafficking,
are often able to transfer or spend substantial amounts
without using the formal financial system. There are
indications that substantial amounts are transferred
physically to and from destinations in South Africa,
whether by the criminals themselves or by third parties
who act as couriers. Cash can be transferred physically
in many ways, but during the RAU workshop specific
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examples were cited where cash was strapped to bodies of
passengers in motor vehicles and aircraft or hidden in
their luggage. Similar methods are used to convey cash
across the borders of South Africa. While it is
legitimate to convey cash physically within South African
borders, substantial cash amounts can only be transferred
across South Africa's borders legally if the exchange
control requirements have been met.
Criminals launder illicit cash in many ways. As outlined
earlier, luxury goods, vehicles and real estate may be
bought. Trust accounts of professionals such as attorneys
and estate agents are sometimes used to place the cash
amounts in the financial system. Automatic teller
machines and automatic vending machines selling cell
phone products have also been used to place cash amounts.
Laundering of cash also takes place in legal as well as
illegal gambling institutions. In these cases, criminals
or their assistants would often buy gambling chips or
credi ts in cash. After a short period of gambling, the
gambler would return and exchange the chips or credits
for a cheque issued by the gaming institution. Slot
machines in casinos have also proved vulnerable for abuse
by launderers who used them successfully to launder bank
notes that were stained by dye during cash heists. There
is also evidence of laundering of cash at racecourses in
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South Africa. In some instances, the launderer would buy
a winning ticket from a punter for a cash amount, which
constitutes a premium on seller's actual winnings.
Abuse of financial institutions
South Africa has a well-developed financial system.
Products on offer vary from Internet banking facilities
and offshore unit trust investments to small savings
accounts for a target audience comprising people who have
not previously had a bank account or are under-banked.
Exchange controls have deterred the large-scale abuse of
the financial system by international launderers.
However, South African criminals are abusing the system
in many different ways to launder and invest their ill-
gotten gains. According to the report, a sizable amount
of dirty money is still deposited into bank accounts.
Criminals sometimes deposit money into their own bank
accounts, but more sophisticated criminals often open
accounts with false identification documentation or open
these in the names of front companies or trusts.
There is also a trend of using legitimate bank accounts
of family members or third parties. An arrangement is
made with a family member who allows the criminal to
deposi t and withdraw money from his or her account. In
subsequent investigations, the family member invariably
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pleads ignorance of the true nature of the funds that
were deposited. The first two convictions that were
handed down for statutory money laundering in South
Africa were based on such arrangements. There is also
evidence that more sophisticated criminals are using
credi t and debit card facilities to launder money and
especially to move proceeds of crime across the borders
of South Africa. Automatic teller machines are also used
to deposit and withdraw money. Automatic teller machines
that offer the facility to generate bank cheques have
featured in particular laundering schemes. Bearer
documents such as Negotiable Certificates of Deposit have
also been employed in sophisticated schemes.
During the RAU workshop cases were also cited of
insurance products being used to launder money. Single
premium policies are bought with the proceeds of crime or
the proceeds are used to pay monthly premiums. In some
cases, the launderer makes an overpayment and then asks
for a repayment" of the excess amount. When the company
repays the excess amount, the launderer represents the
money as a payment in terms of an insurance product. In
other cases, the launderer buys and surrenders policies.
There is a substantial market in second-hand policies in
South Africa and this market is also vulnerable to abuse
by launderers.
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Abuse of the informal sector of the economy
The prevalence of informal business enterprises in South
Africa, coupled with the general absence of formal
financial and other business records, allow for the abuse
of such enterprises by launderers. They serve as
convenient front businesses because it is difficult to
dispute the business's alleged turnover in relation to
its actual turnover. In fact, it is often impractical for
formal sector businesses to attempt to verify business
information
businesses.
furnished to them by informal sector
Sizable amounts of cash are also deposited into
community-based rotating credit schemes that operate
general savings schemes (for instance stokvels), or
In the majority of these cases, all the
dedicated
societies)
savings schemes (for instance burial
members are known to one another. Every member regularly
deposits an agreed sum of money into a fund that is
given, in whole or in part, to each member in rotation.
Al though a launderer cannot penetrate the maj ori ty of
schemes, a launderer could operate a sham stokvel as a
front to launder money.
Underground banking systems in the form of hawala/hundi
systems are operating in South Africa within specific
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ethnic communi ties. These systems have apparently been
used for many years to evade exchange control
restrictions and expensive foreign exchange transaction
fees. There are a number of other organizations, which
operate on the outer fringes of the regulatory systems
that are also vulnerable to abuse as front businesses by
launderers. These include NGOs, chari table institutions
and churches.
The abuse of the informal sector by launderers is a cause
for concern. The laundering laws primarily regulate the
formal sector of the economy. The extent of laundering in
the informal economy cannot be estimated with any degree
of certainty, but it is probably substantial. Arguments
that laundered proceeds in the informal economy will be
detected at the stage when such funds enter the formal
sector of the economy do not sufficiently discount the
nature of the informal sector of the economy. Proceeds
can be placed, layered and integrated in the informal
sector without entering the formal sector of the economy.
If a launderer requires the proceeds to enter the formal
sector, he can ensure that they do so at a stage when
they have been laundered sufficiently and cannot be
linked to unlawful activity any more.
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Professional assistance
Many laundering schemes are too complicated to be planned
and executed by the criminals themselves. There is clear
evidence that knowledgeable persons do assist criminals
to launder money. These persons often have legal, banking
or tax expertise or general business acumen. For example,
in the first case in which a conviction was handed down
for statutory money laundering, state v Dustigar, an
attorney and a police officer played key roles in
planning and operating different laundering schemes.
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Chapter 7
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA)
The origins of FICA can be traced back to August 1996
when the South African Law Commission published a Money
Laundering Control Bill as part of a report entitled
Money laundering and related matters (Smi t: 1999). The
Bill provided for regulatory structures and mechanisms to
combat money laundering. However, the government did not
take immediate action on the legislation. In 1998, the
Department of Finance appointed a task team to advise it
on the appropriateness of the Bill. The Department of
Finance produced a new Financial Intelligence Centre Bill
based on the recommendations of the Task Team. Further
consultation, especially with other government
departments, took place before the Bill was finally
approved by Cabinet and submitted to parliament in 2001.
After much deliberation, public comment and extensive
amendment the legislation was passed and the President
signed it on 28 November 2001. However, its provisions
only came into effect on 1 June 2003 as determined by the
President by proclamation. The Act which is therefore
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relatively new to South Africans and being a focal point
of this study requires a summary to place into
perspective the following chapters of this study. As
such, an attempt is made to set out the main components
relevant to this study. This is merely a summary of the
Act and it is not a substitute for the legislation
itself. The actual Act comprises 5 chapters over 80 pages
long.
7.1 Summary of the ACT
CHAPTER 1 - FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE (FIC)
SECTIONS 2 - 16
Chapter one of the Act establishes the Financial
Intelligence Centre, whose main objectives are to
identify the proceeds of unlawful activities and to
combat money-laundering activities. The FIC will be
involved mainly in the processing, analyzing and
interpretation of information disclosed to it and
obtained by it. It will however also monitor and give
guidance to accountable institutions (see annexure 1) and
supervisory bodies regarding their duties under and in
compliance with the Act.
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CHAPTER 2 - MONEY LAUNDERING ADVISORY COUNCIL (MLAC)
SECTIONS 17 - 20
This chapter establishes the Money Laundering Advisory
Council MLAC, which consists of representatives of
accountable institutions, supervisory bodies and organs
of state approved by the Minister. MLAC's function is to
advise the Minister on policies and best practices in
order to identify the proceeds of unlawful activi ties,
and to combat money laundering activities, as well as to
advise the FIC concerning the performance by the FIC of
its functions. MLAC also acts as a forum for the various
representatives in which they can consult one another.
CHAPTER 3 - MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL MEASURES
SECTIONS 21 - 45
Section 21 - Identification of clients and other persons
An accountable institution may not establish a business
relationship, or conclude a single transaction, with a
client unless it has taken the prescribed steps to
establish and verify the identity of the client, any
person who is acting on behalf of a client and any person
on whose behalf the client may be acting.
Section 22 - Record to be kept of business relationships
and transactions
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All documentation used to identify and verify clients and
client accounts must be kept. A record must also be kept
of the name of the person who obtained the client
identification and verification documents. Records must
also be kept of all transactions, identifying the amounts
and parties involved.
Section 23 - Period for which records must be kept
The relevant records must be kept for at least 5 years
from the date on which a business relationship is
terminated or, if there is no business relationship, from
the date on which a single transaction is concluded.
Section 24 - third parties may keep Records
If a third party keeps the relevant records, their
details must be provided to the FIC. The accountable
institution must have free and easy access to the
records. Any failure by the third party to comply
properly with the requirements of section 22 will result
in the accountable institution being held liable. You
cannot simply rely on the third party.
Section 25 - Admissibility of records
Certified extracts of records and certified printouts of
electronic records are, on their mere production before a
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court, admissible as evidence of any fact contained in
them of which direct oral evidence would be admissible.
section 26 - FIC's access to records
An authorized representative of the FIC is entitled to
have access during working hours to all records kept by
an accountable institution in terms of section 22 and
section 24. However, unless the records are those that
the public is entitled to have access to, the authorized
representative may only exercise these powers by virtue
of a warrant issued in chambers by a magistrate, regional
magistrate or judge. An accountable institution must,
wi thout delay, give an authorised representative of the
Centre all reasonable assistance.
Section 27 - Accountable institutions to advise FIC of
clients.
If an authorized representative of the FIC requests an
accountable institution to advise whether a specified
person is or has been a client, either directly or
indirectly of the institution, they must inform the FIC
accordingly.
section 28 - Cash transactions above prescribed limit
Cash paid to or received from a client must be reported
within a prescribed period. There are, however, no
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regulations in relation to this section yet so the
prescribed limit has not yet been set.
Section 29 - Suspicious and unusual transactions
Any person who carries on a business, is in charge of or
manages a business or who is employed by a business and
who knows or suspects:
• that the business has received or is about to
receive the proceeds of unlawful activities; or
• that one or more transactions by that business with
a third person will facilitate the transfer of
proceeds of unlawful 'activities;
• that a transaction with a third person has no
apparent lawful or business purpose; or
• that a transaction is being conducted by a third
person to avoid being reported under this Act; or
• that the transaction or series of transactions may
be relevant to the investigation of an evasion or
attempted evasion of a duty to pay any tax, duty or
levy imposed by legislation administered by the
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service;
or
• that the business has been used or is about to be
used for money laundering purposes must report this
to the FIC within the prescribed period. This period
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is as soon as possible, but not later than 15
business days. It is important to note that the
person making the report may not disclose to any
other person the fact that he or she has made the
report, and no person who knows or suspects that a
report is or will be made may disclose this fact to
any other person.
Section 30 - Conveyance of cash to or from Republic
Any person intending to convey cash to or from the
Republic that exceeds a prescribed amount will have to
report this to a person authorized by the Minister for
this purpose. Again, there are no regulations in relation
to this section yet, so the prescribed amount has not yet
been set.
Section 31 - Electronic transfers of money to or from the
Republic
Money received from outside of RSA or sent to a country
outside of RSA that is over a prescribed amount must be
reported to the FIC. The FIC will be entitled to request
prescribed particulars. Again, there are no regulations
and therefore no prescribed amount in relation to this
section yet.
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Section 32 Reporting procedures and furnishing of
additional information
Reports as required under sections 28, 29, 30 & 31 must
be made in the format prescribed by the FIC. Only the
FIC, an investigating authority acting with the
permission of the FIC or an authorized officer may
request information over and above that contained in the
original report made to the FIC. This information is to
be furnished without delay.
Section 33 - Continuation of transactions
A transaction in respect of which a report is required to
be made may be continued with unless the FIC directs
otherwise.
Section 34 - Intervention by Centre
The FIC may direct an accountable institution, reporting
institution or a person making a report in terms of
section 28 and section 29, in writing, not to proceed
wi th a transaction or proposed transaction or any other
transaction in respect of the funds affected by that
transaction. The transaction can only be "frozen" for a
total of 5 days (not taking into account weekends and
public holidays) while the FIC makes the necessary
enquiries and, if it deems
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appropriate, inform and advise an investigating authority
or the National Director of Public Prosecutions.
Section 35 - Monitoring orders
A designated judge may, on receipt of a written
application from the FIC, order an accountable
institution to report to the FIC on all transactions
concluded by a specified person or account. The order
will be granted if there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that funds transferred to or received by the
accountable institution are the proceeds of unlawful
activities, or that the account is being used to launder
money. This order lapses after 3 months but may be
extended, at the discretion of the judge, if the
reasonable grounds for the suspicion still exist or the
judge deems that the interests of justice will best be
served by continued monitoring.
Section 36 - Information held by supervisory bodies and
SARS
If a supervisory body or SABS knows or suspects that an
accountable institution is being used or is about to be
used for money laundering purposes, or that the
institution has wittingly or unwittingly received or is
about to receive the proceeds of unlawful activities, it
must inform the FIC of the facts and provide the FIC with
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any documentation or information that it may possess. If
the FIC believes that a supervisory body or SARS has
information in this regard, the FIC may request the
supervisory body or SARS to furnish it with all
information and any records regarding that accountable
institution. The supervisory body and SARS may make such
reasonable procedural arrangements, and impose such
reasonable safeguards regarding the furnishing of such
information as they consider appropriate to maintain the
confidentiality of that information.
Section 37 - Reporting duty and obligations to provide
information not affected by confidentiality rules
No duty of secrecy or confidentiality or any other
restriction on the disclosure of information, whether
imposed by legislation or arising from the common law or
agreement, affects compliance with this Act. The only
exception applies to the common law right to legal
professional privilege between an attorney and his/her
client.
Section 38 - Protection of persons making reports
No action, whether criminal or civil, may be brought
against anyone who complies in good faith with a
provision of this Part of the Act. A person who has made,
initiated or contributed to a report in terms of S28, S29
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or S31 is competent but not compellable to give evidence
in criminal proceedings. No evidence concerning the
identity of these persons is admissible as evidence in
criminal proceedings unless that person testifies at
those proceedings.
Section 39 - Admissibility as evidence of reports made to
Centre
A certificate issued by an official of the FIC that
information specified in the certificate was reported or
sent to the FIC on its mere production in a matter before
a court admissible as evidence of any fact contained in
it of which direct oral evidence would be admissible.
Section 40 - Access to information held by the Centre
No person is entitled to information held by the FIC,
except:
• an investigating authority inside the Republic, the
SARS and the intelligence services, on the written
authority of an authorised officer or at the
initiative of the FIC if either of these parties
believes such information is required to investigate
suspected unlawful activity;
• an entity outside the Republic performing similar
functions to those of the FIC, or an investigating
authority outside the Republic, if the FIC believes
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the information is relevant to the identification of
the proceeds of unlawful activities or the combating
of money laundering in that particular country;
• an accountable institution or reporting institution
or any other person who may, at the initiative of
the FIC, be provided with information regarding the
steps taken by the FIC in connection with
transactions reported by that party, subject to
certain conditions. If the FIC reasonably believes
that disclosure to an accountable institution,
reporting institution or other person of information
requested could inhibit the achievement of the
objectives of the FIC or another organ of state or
the performance of their functions, or prejudice the
rights of any person, it will not provide the
information requested. The FIC will also provide
information if this is requested in terms of an
order of a court or in terms of other national
legislation.
Section 41 - Protection of confidential information
No person may disclose confidential information held by
or obtained from the FIC, except -
• within the scope of that person's powers and duties
in terms of any legislation;
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• for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
this Act;
• with the permission of the Centre;
• for the purpose of legal proceedings, including any
proceedings before a judge in chambers; or
• in terms of an order of court.
Section 42 - Formulation and implementation of internal
rules
An accountable institution must formulate and implement
internal rules concerning-
• establishment and verification of identity of
clients;
• the information on which records must be kept and
how and where the information must be stored;
• steps to be taken to determine whether a transaction
is reportable; and
• such other matters as may be prescribed.
The internal rules must comply with the requirements
prescribed in the regulations, and must be made available
to all employees involved in transactions to which the
Act applies, as well as on request to the FIC or
appropriate supervisory body.
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Section 43 - Training and monitoring of compliance
An accountable institution must:
• provide training to its employees to enable them to
comply with the Act and the internal rules;
• appoint a person with the responsibility to ensure
compliance by
the employees of the institution; and
the institution itself with the Act and the
internal rules.
Section 44 Referral of suspected offences to
investigating authorities and other public bodies
If the FIC has reasonable grounds to suspect that an
accountable institution, or any other person other than a
supervisory body, has contravened or failed to comply
with the Act, the FIC may refer the matter to a relevant
investigating authority, an appropriate supervisory body
or other public body or authority affected by it. The FIC
may make any recommendation it considers appropriate in
this regard.
Section 45 -Responsibility for supervision of accountable
institution
Each supervisory body is responsible for supervising
compliance with the provisions of Chapter 3 by each
accountable institution regulated or supervised by it. If
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the FIC refers a matter to a supervisory body, they must
investigate it and take whatever steps are in their power
to remedy the matter. Should they fail to do this, the
FIC may take such steps within the scope of its powers to
remedy the matter.
CHAPTER 4 - OFFENCES AND PENALITIES
SECTIONS 46 - 71
Section 68 - Penalties
1) A person convicted of an offence mentioned in this
Chapter, other than an offence mentioned in subsection
(2), is liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding
15 years or to a fine not exceeding RIO million.
2) A person convicted of an offence mentioned in section
55 (failure to send report), 61 (failure to formulate and
implement internal rules) or 62 (failure to provide
training or appoint a compliance officer) is liable to
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or to
a fine not exceeding Rl million.
Section 69 - Defences
If a person who is an employee, director or trustee of,
or a partner in, an accountable institution is charged
wi th committing an offence under section 52 (failure to
report suspicious or unusual transactions), that person
may raise as a defence the fact that he or she had-
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(a) complied with the applicable obligations in terms
of the internal rules relating to the reporting of
information of the accountable institution; or
(b) reported the matter to the person charged with the
responsibility of ensuring compliance by the
accountable institution with its duties under this
Act; or
(c) reported the matter to his or her superior, if
any, if-
(i) the accountable institution had not appointed
such a person or established such rules; or
(ii) the accountable institution had not complied
with its obligations in section 42(3) in
respect of that person; or
(iii) the internal rules were not applicable to that
person.
Section 70 - Search, seizure and forfeiture
This section is concerned with seizure and forfeiture of
cash contemplated in section 30 and in connection with
the suspected commission of an offence under section 54
in respect of that cash or any portion of it. Whenever a
person is convicted of an offence under section 54 or 64
the court convicting that person must, in addition to any
punishment which that court may impose in respect of the
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offence, declare any property in respect of which those
transactions were conducted to be forfeited to the State.
Section 71 - Jurisdiction of courts
1) A regional court has jurisdiction to impose any
penalty mentioned in section 68(1), even though
that penalty may exceed the penal jurisdiction
of that court.
2) A magistrate's court has jurisdiction to impose
any penalty mentioned in section 68(2), even
though that penalty may exceed the penal
jurisdiction of that court.
3) A magistrate's court or regional court has
jurisdiction to make any order of forfeiture
referred to in section 70, even though the
amount forfeitable under that order may exceed
the civil jurisdiction of the magistrate's
court or regional court.
CHAPTER 5 - MISCELLANEOUS
SECTIONS 72 - 82
Section 72 - Act not to limit powers of investigating
authorities or supervisory bodies
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This Act does not detract from-
(a) an investigating authority's powers in terms of
other legislation to obtain information for the
purpose of criminal investigations; or
(b) a supervisory body's duties or powers in relation
to the entities supervised or regulated by it.
Section 73 Amendment of list of accountable
institutions
The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, amend the
list of accountable institutions in Schedule 1 to add to
the list any person or category of persons, delete any
institution or category of institutions from the list or
make technical changes to the list. Before the Minister
amends Schedule 1, the Minister must consult MLAC and the
FIC. Any addition to or deletion from the list of
accountable institutions in Schedule 1 must, before
publication in the Gazette, be approved by Parliament.
Section 74 - Exemptions for accountable institutions
The Minister may, after consulting MLAC and the FIC, and
on conditions and for a period determined by the
from compliance with any of theexemptMinister,
provisions of this Act a person, an accountable
institution, or a category of persons or accountable
institutions. He may also exempt from any or all of the
68
provisions of this Act, a person or category of persons
or an accountable institution or category of accountable
institutions in respect of anyone or more categories of
transactions. Any exemption referred to must be by notice
in the Gazette and may be wi thdrawn or amended by the
Minister, after consulting with MLAC and the FIC and must
be tabled in Parliament before being published in the
Gazette.
Section 76 - Amendment of list of reporting institutions
The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, amend the
list of reporting institutions in Schedule 3 to add,
delete or make technical changes to the list. Before the
Minister amends Schedule 3, the Minister must consult the
FIC and MLAC, and-
(a) if only one person will be affected by the proposed
amendment, give the person at least 30 days'
written notice to submit written representations to
the Minister; or
(b) if a category of persons will be affected by the
proposed amendment, by notice in the Gazette give
persons belonging to that category at least 60
days' written notice to submit written
representations to the Minister. Any addition to or
deletion from the list of reporting institutions in
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Schedule 3 must, before publication in the Gazette,
be approved by Parliament.
Section 77 - Regulations
(1) The Minister, after consulting MLAC and the
FIC, may make, repeal and amend regulations
concerning- (a) any matter that may be
prescribed in terms of this Act; and (b) any
other matter which is necessary or expedient
to prescribe or to promote the objectives of
this Act.
(2) Regulations may- (a) differ for different
accountable institutions, reporting
institutions, persons, categories of
accountable institutions, reporting
institutions and persons and different
categories of transactions; (b) be limited to
a particular accountable institution or
reporting institution or person or category of
accountable institutions or reporting
institutions or persons or a particular
category of transactions; and (c) for a
contravention of or failure to comply with any
specific regulation, prescribe imprisonment
for a period not exceeding six months or a
fine not exceeding RI00 000.
70
(3) Regulations in terms of subsection (1) must be
reviewed by MLAC within two years after being
published in the Gazette and thereafter at
such intervals as MLAC deems appropriate.
(4) The Minister must table regulations, repeals
and amendments made under subsection (1) in
Parliament before publication in the Gazette.
Section 78 - Indemnity
The Minister, the FIC or an employee or representative of
the FIC, or any other person performing a function or
exercising a power in terms of this Act, is not liable
for anything done in good faith in terms of or in
furthering the objectives of this Act.
7.2 The Financial Intelligence Centre
7.2.1 Its place between Business and Government
The Financial Intelligence Centre is constituted as a
juristic person located outside the public service, but
within the public administration in terms of section 195
of the Constitution. It is accountable through the
Minister of Finance to Parliament and is funded mainly
from the national budget. The Centre functions as an
independent agency alongside the investigating
authorities providing them with information gleaned from
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reports made to it by accountable institutions. The
authorities include the:
• South African Police Services;
• Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions);
• Asset Forfeiture Unit;
• South African Revenue Service;
• Intelligence Services; and the
• Exchange Control department of the South African
Reserve Bank.
The Centre has also sought to develop its relationship
with the various supervisory bodies, which are listed in
Schedule 2 of the Act (listed below). The purpose is to
facilitate them being able to fulfil their
responsibilities as set out in the Act. The Act requires
these bodies to ensure that the accountable institutions
falling wi thin their area of oversight function is in
full compliance with the legislation. The supervisory
bodies designated in the Act are:
• The Financial Services Board
• The South African Reserve Bank
• The Registrar of Companies
• The Estate Agents Board
• The Public Accountants and Auditors Board
• The National Gambling Board
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• The JSE Securities Exchange South Africa.
• The Law Society of South Africa.
The concepts and operation discussed above is illustrated
below as envisaged by the Financial Intelligence Centre.
FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING THE
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE







I va $ S owoUti
Source: Financial Intelligence Centre Website
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7.3 The FIe in practice
7.3.1 Overview
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001, sets up a
regulatory anti-money laundering regime, which is
intended to break the cycle used by organized criminal
groups to benefit from illegitimate profits. By doing
this the Act aims to maintain the integrity of the
financial system. Apart from the regulatory regime the
Act also creates the Financial Intelligence Centre.
The regulatory regime of the Financial Intelligence
Centre Act imposes 'know your client', record-keeping and
reporting obligations on accountable institutions. It
also requires accountable institutions to develop and
implement internal rules to facilitate compliance with
these obligations.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act is the result of 5
years of investigation and development. It complements
and works with the Prevention of Organized Crime Act,
1998 which contains the substantive money laundering
offences.
7.3.2. Objectives
The Financial Intelligence Centre is established in order
to identify the proceeds of unlawful activi ties and to










Scorpions, the Special Investigating Unit and the Asset
Forfeiture Unit), the intelligence services and the
Revenue Service. The Financial Intelligence Centre will
also exchange information with similar bodies in other
countries.
7.3.3. Functions
In order to fulfill its objectives the Centre will
collect, process, analyze and interpret information
reported to it in terms of various statutory reporting





the Revenue Service and the
intelligence services and to cooperate with these bodies
in the performance of their functions. The Centre will
also monitor compliance with the Financial Intelligence
Centre Act and give guidance to accountable institutions,
supervisory bodies and others. The Centre will in the
course of the performance of its functions build up a
database of information, which it will retain and utilize
to support the above-mentioned bodies in the performance
of their functions. Finally the Centre will promote the
appointment of persons to specialize in measures to
detect and counter money laundering.
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By performing these functions the Centre will become a
repository of information concerning financial
transactions. It will also play an important role in co-
coordinating policy and efforts to counter money-
laundering activities, which form part of a decentralized
but integrated anti-money laundering regime (Financial
Intelligence Centre Annual Report: 2004).
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Chapter 8
Money Laundering and the Fiscus
Of the underlying forms of illegal activity, tax evasion
is, perhaps, the one with the most obvious macroeconomic
impact. Money laundering makes government's tax
collection procedures more difficult and diminishes tax
revenue to the fiscus. The resulting loss of untaxed
revenue generally means higher tax rates for law-abiding
citizens and corporates. The cumulative effect of
laundering activi ties is to destabilise the foundations
of a country's financial system (Glover: 1997).
The more open and competi tive environment of the last
decade has had many positive effects on our tax systems
in South Africa, including the reduction of tax rates and














competitive forces, which have encouraged countries to
make their tax systems more attractive to investors. In
addition to lowering overall tax rates, a competitive
environment can promote greater efficiency in government
expenditure programs (Financial Intelligence Centre
Annual Report: 2004).
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However, some tax and related practices are anti-
competitive and can undercut the gains that tax
competi tion generates. This can occur when governments
introduce practices designed to encourage noncompliance
wi th the tax laws of other countries (for example the
practice of so called "tax havens" discussed earlier in
chapter 3) .
Many countries have put in place measures to prevent the
erosion of their tax bases. Such measures often increase
the complexity of their tax systems and put greater
burdens and costs on tax administrations as well as on
compliant taxpayers. Ultimately, taxpayer confidence in
the fairness of the tax system, and in government in
general, declines as honest taxpayers feel that they
shoulder a greater share of the tax burden and that
government cannot effectively enforce its own tax laws.
Harmful tax practices also distort financial and,
indirectly, real investment flows. Furthermore, such
practices undermine the ability of each country to decide
for itself the allocation of tax burden among mobile and
less mobile tax bases, such as labor, property and
consumption (Walter: 1990).
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8.1 The role of the South African Revenue
Services (SARS)
The South Africa Revenue Service, which includes the
Customs Service, is responsible for revenue collection
and the investigation of tax evasion and evasion of
customs duties, and works closely with law enforcement
agencies on money laundering matters.
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) creates a
special relationship between the Financial Intelligence
Centre (FIC) and the SARS. The FIC data will assist SARS
to combat tax evasion and to collect taxes more
effectively. Section 29 of the ACT (suspicious and
unusual transactions) explicitly requires all businesses
to report any transactions that may be relevant to the
investigation of any evasion or attempted evasion of a
duty to pay a tax, levy or duty under any legislation
that is administered by the SARS. The SARS, in turn, is
required by FICA to divulge certain information relating
to the possible abuse of an accountable institution for
laundering, or its possible involvement therein, to the
FIC. However, section 36 (2) of FICA allows the SARS to
make reasonable procedural arrangements and to impose
reasonable safeguards to maintain the confidentiality of
the information that is disclosed in terms of FICA.
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The SARS and the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the National
Director of Public Prosecutions have also established a
capacity to investigate money laundering. Each
institution obviously has its own unique focus on
laundering: the SARS focuses on money laundering linked
to tax evasion and the Asset Forfeiture Unit on the
confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds and
instrumentalities of crime. However, their investigations










investigators to money laundering and a core group of
investigators of SARS has also been trained in money
laundering control.
8.2 Potential impact of FICA on the Fiscus
Whilst the new legislation cannot totally eradicate the
laundering of undeclared income or the proceeds of tax
evasion, the many obligations now placed on accountable
institutions (banks, casinos, insurance companies etc) in
terms of FICA is most likely to be a further deterrent to
tax evasion. Money laundering by its very nature does not
lend itself to being accurately measured but based on
conservatives estimates discussed in chapter 3, this can
amount to a substantial loss to the fiscus. The estimated
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range of between two and five percent of the worlds GDP
would translate to between R24 billion and R60 billion
being laundered in South Africa annually. (Based on SA's
GDP projection of approximately R1, 2 trillion for 2004 -
Department of Finance: 2003) If one applies the minimum
marginal tax rate of 18%, one arrives at a potential
annual loss of between R4.32 billion and R10.8 billion to
the fiscus.
The Australian Tax Office has reported significant
success in using data from AUSTRAC (Australia's Financial
Intelligence Centre). The use of AUSTRAC data by the Tax
Office has increased significantly in recent times with
the renewed field focus on the cash economy. When
comparing usage from 1999-2000 to 2002-03, there has been
a 40% increase in the incidence of checking AUSTRAC data
for casework. AUSTRAC reports indicate tax results
achieved through the use of their data in the 2002-03
year amounted to AUS $ 99.2 million in revenue (Austrac
Annual report: 2003).
AUSTRAC data has also played a significant role in
achieving the prosecution of several persons involved in
significant tax avoidance activities. Profiling using the
AUSTRAC database identified in one instance a building
construction company making weekly cash withdrawals
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totaling $8M over a five-year period. These were checked
against the taxpayer's records, which revealed that the
wi thdrawals were recorded as purchases and supported by
false invoices. Subsequent audit activi ty culminated in
search warrants being executed and, as a result, the cash
wi thdrawals were found to be untaxed cash payments to
employees and subcontractors. Tax and penalties of $3.2M
were assessed and on prosecution, the directors pleaded
guilty to fraud charges. The trial judge found that the
directors had engaged in deliberate and systematic tax
fraud. As a result, one director was sentenced to 18
months imprisonment and the other received a 12-month




The integrity of the banking and financial services
marketplace depends heavily on the perception that it
functions within a framework of high legal, professional
and ethical standards. A reputation for integrity is the
one of the most valuable assets of a financial
institution. If funds from criminal activity can be
easily processed through a particular institution
either because its employees or directors have been
bribed or because the institution turns a blind eye to
the criminal nature of such funds - the institution could
be drawn into complicity with criminals and become part
of the criminal network itself. Evidence of such
complici ty will have a damaging effect on the attitudes
of other financial markets regulatory authorities, as
well as ordinary customers.
As for the potential negative macroeconomic consequences
of unchecked money laundering, the International Monetary
Fund has cited inexplicable changes in money demand,
prudential risks to bank soundness, contamination effects
on legal financial transactions, and increased volatility
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of international capital flows and exchange rates due to
unanticipated cross-border asset transfers.
Such legislation is critical to South Africa's standing
in the international community. The greater knowledge we
have gained about money laundering over the past few
years has confirmed that it is a dynamic activity,
conducted with increasing sophistication. This knowledge
has also confirmed that money laundering is not concerned
with drug trafficking alone, but with any crime that
generates significant proceeds, particularly when
organized crime is involved. Money launderers have shown
that they are responsive to countermeasures and is always
searching for new laundering routes. This is why money
laundering is not confined to the banking sector but can
embrace the whole range of the financial sector and also
spread into non-financial businesses of all sorts. Money
laundering not only poses a threat to financial
institutions, it is also part of a process that endangers
the economy, society and eventually the country itself.
It is unrealistic to expect that money laundering can be
eradicated. What can and is being done is to make money
laundering more difficult and to increase the chance of
money laundering being detected and caught if it is
carried out. Putting in place an effective legal
framework is an essential precondition for this. It must
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also be recognized that it is interruption of the flow of
funds that is likely to achieve the most effective
resul ts. The delaying of funds in transmission so as to
cause liquidity problems for those engaged in operating a
criminal enterprise is likely to be more effective in
harming the criminal activity in question than in
ini tiating difficult and expensive judicial proceedings
which mayor may not result in a forfeiture order.
South Africa has a comprehensive framework for money
laundering control. The challenge that it now faces is to
implement the system. If done correctly, the system could
contribute to the development of the South African
economy as well as the combating of crime in the country.
It is clear that South Africa will be able to rely on the
available international expertise in money laundering
control in this process. However, South Africa faces many
challenges that are foreign to developed economies, for
instance those in respect of the abuse of its informal
economy by launderers. South Africa will have to
formulate its own answers and strategies in this regard.
Greater cooperation between the countries in the region
will enable South Africa and the other countries to pool
their expertise and resources and to develop systems that
will effectively address money laundering as it is
manifested in their economies.
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The following institutions are
institutions in Schedule





1. An attorney as defined in the Attorneys Act, 1979
(Act 53 of 1979).
2. A board of executors or a trust company or any
other person that invests, keeps in safe custody,
controls or administers trust property wi thin the
meaning of the Trust Property Control Act, 1988
(Act 57 of 1988).
3. An estate agent as defined in the Estate Agents
Act, 1976 (Act 112 of 1976).
4. A financial instrument trader as defined in the
Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act 55 of
1989) .
5. A management company registered in terms of the
Unit Trusts Control Act, 1981 (Act 54 of 1981).
6. A person who carries on the "business of a bank"
as defined in the Banks Act, 1990 (Act 94 of 1990).
7. A mutual bank as defined in the Mutual Banks Act,
1993 (Act 124 of 1993).
8. A person who carries on a "long-term insurance
business" as defined in the Long-Term Insurance
Act, 1998 (Act 52 of 1998), including an insurance
broker and an agent of an insurer.
9. A person who carries on a business in respect of
which a gambling licence is required to be issued
by a provincial licensing authority.
10. A person who carries on the business of dealing in
foreign exchange.
11. A person who carries on the business of lending
money against the security of securities.
12. A person who carries on the business of rendering
investment advice or investment broking services,
including a public accountant as defined in the
Public Accountants and Auditors Act, 1991 (Act 80
of 1991), who carries on such a business.
13. A person who issues, sells or redeems travellers'
cheques, money orders or similar instruments.
14. The Postbank referred to in section 51 of the
Postal Services Act, 1998 (Act 124 of 1998).
15. A member of a stock exchange licensed under the
Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act 1 of 1985).
16. The Ithala Development Finance Corporation Limited.
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17. A person who has been approved or who falls within
a category of persons approved by the Registrar of
Stock Exchanges in terms of section 4 (1) (a) of
the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act 1 of
1985) .
18. A person who has been approved or who falls within
a category of persons approved by the Registrar of
Financial Markets in terms of section 5 (l) (a) of
the Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act 55 of
1989) .
19. A person who carries on the business of a money
remitter.
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